Around half of Karachi's population resides in localities that started life as unplanned settlem ents, which acquired different lev els of security from ev iction. This paper exam ines the relationship between dem and-m aking by unplanned settlem ents and urban political process. It interprets the gradual transform ation of a cluster originally on the geographic and social periphery of the city into a regularised colony through the lens of collectiv e action. The div erse roles of m igration, m obilisation, and collectiv e identity which we find in indiv idual stories and com m unity histories, capture a range of processes and experiences within Karachi's wide m argin. The politics of regularisation thus offers a critical perspectiv e on the dy nam ics of urban dem ocracy .
While informality , particularly with respect to housing and land use, has a persuasiv e case as an epistemology for, rather than an aberration of, urban planning (Roy 2005) , demand-making by unplanned settlements and not only by their indiv idual inhabitants may hav e a similar claim with respect to urban political processes . Ev ery day struggles and mundane daily practices of migrants and others at the urban margin, for economic and social surv iv al, encompass my riad forms and instances of collectiv e action which hav e the potential to become mov ements (Bay at 1 997 , 2000) . Bay at (2000) argues that the quiet spatial encroachment by the marginal and the migrant through informality is not only redistributiv e but can also add up to transformativ e politics because of the presence of moral elements alongside rational calculation for indiv idual adv antage. He is hopeful that the emergence of forms of collectiv e identity bey ond kinship and ethnicity may prov ide these moral ingredients.
1 This is close to the understanding of a social mov ement theorist such as Polletta (1 999) whose engagement with the concept of 'free space' attempts to clarify the position of culture and norms in the operation of group identity in collectiv e action. 'Prefigurativ e' free spaces, in Polletta's (1 999) tax onomy are those that allow the forging of new identities and interests, and are to be contrasted with 'indigenous' ones, which facilitate collectiv e action among subalterns through pre-ex isting institutional forms. The former are more likely to be associated with transformativ e politics, while the latter are more likely to sustain and succeed in attaining their immediate goals. It is not 'demand-making' as such, but it is its cultural contex t and normativ e content that matters.
2
In this paper we would like to ask if and how demand-making by unplanned settlements shapes the urban political process in Karachi, and indeed national politics in Pakistan. Karachi is no different from other major South Asian cities, or cities elsewhere in Asia, Africa and Latin America with around half of the city 's population residing in localities that started life as unplanned settlements or as settlements not formally planned by state authorities or their legally mandated agents. The city is also not unique in hav ing ex perienced ongoing processes of regularisation of unplanned settlements, with complete post hoc legalisation and titling as only the far end of the spectrum which include many grades of tenure security and civ ic prov ision. Roy 's (2009) incisiv e critique of urban planning in India would be at home in Karachi, ev en if we do remain more willing than her to use the formal/informal, legal/illegal, and planned/unplanned dichotomies as starting categories. We are interested in demand-making by or on the behalf of unplanned, informal, and illegal settlements which, at least at their outset, were inhabited by non-propertied indigenous or migrants labourers and other marginalised groups and indiv iduals. While there is a rich empirical literature on informality in housing and land use in Karachi, few if any of these studies sought out linkages with the urban political process (Hasan 1 998) . The same holds true the other way . Karachi's politics has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest, particularly since the 1 990s, much of which focused on ethnicity and political organisation with few attempts at ex ploring the interaction of either with informality (Haq 1 995) . An emerging consensus among local observ ers that political and ethnic v iolence, particularly on the city 's demographically significant geographic periphery , is closely connected with contests ov er land use, appears as an inev itable and welcome departure in this regard (Hasan 1 993, Waseem 1 996, Polak 2004 , Hasan 2008 ).
Collective action
Demand-making by or on behalf of unplanned settlements requires collectiv e action. The classical rational choice framework prov ides a rigorous account of constraints to collectiv e action in the form of free-riding indiv iduals and sub-optimal inv estments in public goods (Olson 1 97 1 ). The strength of the Olsonian approach lies in its clarification of the mechanical linkages between collectiv e action, public goods and groups. Public goods and groups are co-defined, and without any necessity to ascribe causation or chronological ordering. A public good is 'any good such that if, any person in a group consumes it, it cannot be feasibly withheld from others in that group' (Olson 197 1 : 14) . Olson's original model and rational choice modifications to it suggest a number of empirical regularities. Voluntary , non-coerciv e collectiv e action will be rarely observ ed in situations where contributions to the production of the public good cannot be indiv idually incentiv ised. Withingroup inequality will improv e the chances of public good production, ev en if it inhibits the participation of most members in production (Baland & Platteau 2007 , Bardhan et al. 2007 . Olson's (1 97 1 ) approach was deliberately set in opposition to prev ailing theories of the group, which laid stress on the intrinsic v alue of group participation to indiv iduals, and focused attention on conditions where indiv idual self-interest had to ex clusiv ely carry the burden of the ex planation of group behav iour. Later dev elopments responding to the empirical prev alence of group activ ity and collectiv e action, in contrast to Olson's (1 97 1 ) skepticism, ex panded the rational choice framework to include considerations of norms, leadership, as well as heterogeneity of indiv iduals not only in terms of wealth but in terms of their motiv ations to contribute to public goods (Ostrom 2000) . Many of the conditions identified by Ostrom (2000) for the resolution of collectiv e action constraints are comparable to perspectiv es offered in the theory of social mov ements (Polletta 1 999, Polletta & Jasper 2001 ) .
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The proliferation of unplanned settlements and the prev alence of on-going processes of regularisation in the face of formal regulation must correspond with the ubiquity of forms and instances of collectiv e action in the city . Regulation refers to the implementation of zoning laws, ev iction of ex isting unplanned settlements and the prev ention of new unplanned settlements taking shape. Regularisation is the post hoc legalisation of ex isting unplanned settlement and their formal incorporation into municipal gov ernance and serv ice deliv ery . The v ery ex istence of an unplanned settlement in opposition to threats of ev iction and legal action requires some indiv iduals to make inherently risky inv estments, which will produce public goods for all group members. The public good in question is the steady improv ement in the security of tenure as ev iction and legal threats are successfully negotiated, and all actual and potential residents will enjoy its benefits without the possibility of ex clusion. The key point here is that in general, tenure security applies by necessity to higher units of aggregation than indiv iduals and families: if a settlement is insecure all residents within it are insecure, and if it gains security of tenure all residents benefit. Returning to Olson (1 97 1 ), therefore, it is possible to frame the settlement as a group and tenure security as its corresponding public good.
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There are two reasons why we are interested in using the original Olson model as a point of departure for interpreting narrativ es of the progressiv e regularisation of an unplanned settlement in the central district of Karachi. First, Olson's model in its barest form focuses on the settlement as the group of The making of a 'colony' reference, which is helpful if we want to understand the implications of settlement formation and consolidation for urban political process. Second, we wish to ex amine if the aggregate effect of demand-making by and on behalf of unplanned settlements might be transformativ e ev en if all of the my riad forms and instances of collectiv e action are motiv ated by rational self-interest alone. In other words, are there possibilities for transformativ e politics if Bay at's (2000) 'quiet encroachment' is shorn of moral content, and these atomised instances of collectiv e action do not v isibly transcend into Polletta's (1 999) 'prefigurativ e' free spaces?
In Section 2 of this paper, we prov ide an account of the process of attaining tenure security in an unplanned settlement in the central district of Karachi spanning a period from the 1 960s to the present. The start of this period coincided with the rise of electoral politics and the election to office of the populist Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP), following 1 4 y ears of military rule. This period also marked a turning point in an ongoing tussle in urban planning between regulation and regularisation of settlements. The PPP gov ernment was ov erthrown in 1 97 7 and replaced by another military regime which lasted till the late 1 980s, and in its twilight period in 1 987 , legislated for the regularisation of unplanned settlements through the specially created Sindh Katchi Abadis Authority (SKAA).
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The late 1 980s saw a major political shift with the emergence of the Muhajir Qaumi Mov ement (MQM), a militant ethnic party championing the cause of Partition migrants, which came to dominate electoral politics in the city .
2 The MQM acquired a reputation for armed force and was frequently in a state of conflict with other parties, ethnic groups and state security forces throughout the 1 990s. The party became a key play er in the 2000s in city and prov incial gov ernments when it was rehabilitated by General Musharraf's military regime following a period when its supporters had faced a crackdown and widespread human rights abuses. The MQM, which had shed its ov ert ethnic identity had become v ested in installing large-scale urban infrastructure projects such as ex press roads and fly ov ers. Towards the end of our period of interest military rule had ended and the MQM had agreed to share power with the PPP.
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In Section 3, we retrace Karachi's political trends from the v antage point of unplanned settlement regulation and regularisation and Section 4 concludes with observ ations about the transformativ e potential of collectiv e action in the demand-making by unplanned settlements.
11
The term katchi abadi literally means impermanent settlement. While proponents of regularisation refer to all unplanned settlements as katchi abadis, official policy has come to reserv e this term for those settlements that might be eligible for regularisation or ones which hav e already been regularised. Many residents of regularised unplanned settlements, conv ersely , resent the use of the term katchi abadi for their neighbourhoods because of its association with marginality . The English word 'colony ' is a commonly used term for unplanned settlements in the city -a usage which is mocked, as we show below, by proponents of regulation.
The Kausar Niazi Colony (KNC) is a settlement, which first appeared in the riv erbed of a natural storm drain known as Gujjar Nala in the early 1 97 0s. It occupied land left aside by the Karachi Dev elopment Authority (KDA), the premier planning body for the city , on the fringes of the newly -established high-income locality of North Nazimabad. The KNC is currently part of Union 
From Gujjar Nala to Kausar Niazi Colony
Council (UC) Hy deri of North Nazimabad Town. Besides the KNC all other segments of this UC consist of planned parts of North Nazimabad. 4 The KNC accounts for 36% of Hy deri's population and around 15% of its total area. The duality between unplanned the KNC and the planned parts of Hy deri can be gauged from the contrast in literacy rates, proportion of non-Muslims, and av erage household size (Table 1 ) . While the rest of UC Hy deri is predominantly Urdu-speaking, the KNC is ethnically heterogeneous with less than 5% of its population estimated to be Muhajir, with the remainder belonging to different ethnic groups including Pashtuns, Punjabis, Seraikis, Bengalis and Baloch. Non-Muslims % 7.6 0.8
Average household size 7.6 6.0
The fieldwork on which we base our case study was conducted between March and May 2009 by a team of researchers including one of the authors (Mallah), another male researcher and two women. The team was familiar with the KNC through prior fieldwork in 2003, which had culminated in a social and phy sical mapping of the colony . The 2009 fieldwork refined the social map with a particular focus on the history of settlement and regularisation of different geographical segments. There were identifiable neighbourhoods clustered around kinship group, ethnicity and religious affiliation, with corresponding narrativ es of leadership, collectiv e identity and marginality . This paper draws upon four key informant interv iews, ten group discussions (with men, women and mix ed gender groups) and fiv e indiv idual cases relating to instances of residential v ulnerability . The choice of respondents was attentiv e to heterogeneity within the colony between neighbourhoods and communities.
14 Zaman Khan, an ethnic Pashtun from a tribal area of northern Pakistan, was acknowledged by most residents as the first person to settle in the area in the early 1 960s. Zaman had been a trav elling salesman who dealt in imported fabric that was brought into the country across the border from Afghanistan. Pashtun traders from both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border had found a niche in smuggling foreign goods that were otherwise restricted or attracted import duties. Landless pastoralist migrants are among the more marginalised segments of tribal Baloch and Afghan societies, but their customary priv ilege of trav ersing international borders and making seasonal camp outside city limits made them v aluable partners in cross-border trade. Zaman set up his fabric shops in the cov er of the campsite of the seasonal migrants.
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While some of Zaman's early partners among the seasonal migrants left, others had remained behind and settled down in Karachi. Aslam Baloch claims
Consolidation
to head a number of Baloch families who came to the Gujjar Nala from v arious regions and kinship groups in the early 1 97 0s. Aslam say s that he can command ov er four hundred v otes at election time, and is currently affiliated with the MQM. He was an office-bearer of the PPP in the past, but dev eloped differences with the party leadership some y ears ago. He along with some other community leaders inv ited PPP prov incial minister Jam Sadiq Ali to a reception at the settlement during the early 1 97 0s in a bid to gain political protection for the settlement. This bid failed, and there was an attempt by municipal authorities to ev ict the settlement in 1 97 2.
Meanwhile, Zaman had also made contacts with PPP leaders and was approached by federal minister Kausar Niazi to join the party and become its office-bearer in the emerging settlement. At the time the area was still sparsely populated and the small cluster of homes around Zaman's camp-market had more potential v oters that the s urrounding planned areas. Kausar Niazi who was also a religious leader prov ided funds for building a mosque, which was named after him. Zaman began lobby ing with v arious ministers and gov ernment officials for official recognition of the colony and the prov ision of public utilities. Kausar Niazi himself v isited the settlement and got Zaman and other PPP members to initiate the registration of residents for national identity cards and in v oter lists. The address recorded in these official documents was Kausar Niazi Colony .
While the colony kept ex panding from the original cluster, with incremental additions of infrastructure at different times, there was also a constant struggle with municipal authorities, priv ate dev elopers, and residents of the neighbouring segments of North Nazimabad. The ex pansion was led by Zaman as well as riv al Pashtun land agents such as Rehmat Khan who had begun taking phy sical possession of areas of land, subdiv iding it and selling off indiv idual plots. Ev ictions were attempted or carried out in 1 97 5, 1 97 8 and then again 1 980 in which parts of the colony were demolished. All these attempts were followed by the return of the residents and rebuilding of homes assisted and protected by the land agents.
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The general method followed by Zaman and other Pashtun land agents in the KNC was not v ery different from what has been observ ed elsewhere in Karachi (Linden & Selier 1 991 ) . Initially , these land agents encouraged migrants to take possession of plots of land that they had themselv es marked out for free or for nominal amounts. They would facilitate the new occupants in building on these plots, while retaining possession of other plots in the same segment. The land agents maintained links with political parties as well as gov ernment officials-the former on the promise of political support and the latter in return for monetary reward. They used these links to help the residents of the plots they sold to resist attempts by municipal authorities to ev iction encroachments.
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Intimidation was a constant theme in the actions of land agents, particularly in the early phase of consolidation. If transactional relations with police and gov ernment officials broke down, or perhaps to underpin those relations, the threat of armed v iolence was ev er-present. Zaman and other Pashtun land agents had family connections in self-gov erned tribal areas with easy access to firearms and places of refuge from state authorities, and these factors were weighed up by those who dealt with them. The v iolent reputation of the Pashtun land agents was periodically reinforced when they pursued mutual v endettas and engaged in deadly clashes with one another.
The relationship between the Pashtun land agents and other residents whom they both encouraged and dominated cannot be understood properly without reference to social marginality . The migrants initially mobilised or encouraged by Zaman and his peers were without ex ception from castes, tribes, kinship groups and religious minorities liv ing on the margins of rural communities across the country and bey ond. The land agents while poor to begin with were not socially marginal in the sense that they faced activ e oppression and discrimination in their areas of origin or elsewhere. If any thing, the political and administrativ e marginality of their home regions added to their reputation for v iolence, which augmented their power in the KNC and in the city generally .
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We recorded many instances where the asy mmetric social position and political power of the Pashtun land agents and their clients had been deploy ed to the disadv antage of the latter. These abuses of asy mmetric power, howev er, were a small part of the relationship, which was otherwise based on mutual dependence, at least in the initial period of consolidation. The Pashtun land agents who saw economic opportunities in the informal housing market needed the socially marginalised migrants just as much as the latter needed them. In order to establish a settlement it was necessary to situate not just indiv idual men, but a number of families who would set up home, no matter how precarious the situation. According to the y oung son of a murdered Pashtun land agent Rehmat Khan 'we are people with honour and will nev er bring our families and womenfolk to liv e in a settlement that has not been regularised.' He was contrasting his family 's honour code with the less restrained outlook of his clients, but also with that of his riv al Zaman whose own family did reside in the KNC from the outset. It was another matter than Zaman had contracted sev eral marriages with women from the v arious socially marginalised groups who had come to settle in the KNC, as part of his strategy to ex pand and consolidate the settlement.
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The significance of women in resisting ev iction was highlighted by the ex perience of a group of families belonging to the Odh community .
6 They had arriv ed in the KNC in the 1 97 0s after hav ing been ev icted from another unplanned settlement at the site of a public park a few kilometres away . Just as Pashtun men act as effectiv e land agents due to their reputed ability to inflict and withstand v iolence, residents of the KNC acknowledge the strength of Odh women and grudgingly admit that police and land agents are scared of them.
Police officers who were sent to forcibly ev ict them from the site of the public park ended up negotiating a v oluntary departure in lieu of alternate land in the KNC. The Odh segment of the KNC was established without the direct inv olv ement of the Pashtun land agents, and the fierce reputation of Odh women was a factor in the Odhs acquiring autonomy .
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Another group of migrants from a marginalised group are led by Mirza, a middle-aged transport worker whose father arriv ed in Karachi in the 1 960s from a v illage called Lawa in the Potohar plateau of northern Punjab. Mirza's family belongs to the Muslim Shaikh caste, which is pejorativ ely called Mussalli, and who work predominantly as farm labourers or brick kiln workers, often under conditions of debt bondage. 'Our family used to liv e and work as serv ants of landlords in their fields, homes and animal sheds. There is no freedom under the shadow of the landlords' say s Mirza. His father was among the first from the Muslim Shaikhs of Lawa to hav e arriv ed in Karachi. He bought a v acant plot from a Pashtun land agent and then encouraged his relativ es and other Muslim Shaikhs from Lawa to also migrate to Karachi. Ov er time they began to insist on being known as the Lawa community instead of Milestones the caste identifier Muslim Shaikh, which they and others associate with low status. Mirza is now acknowledged as a leader of the Lawa who number ov er 50 families in the KNC.
There were sev eral important milestones that were achiev ed by the colony through self-organisation, since the 1 960s. Some of its segments got electricity connections in 1 97 2 through the link between Zaman and Minister Kausar Niazi. The ov erthrow of the PPP gov ernment in 1 97 7 and Kausar Niazi's fall from power temporarily stalled but did not rev erse the consolidation of the KNC. Older residents report that they had started constructing cement and concrete structures in place of mud and thatch huts in the early 1 980s. Although Zaman continued to play an important part in regulating land occupation and transactions, other lobby ists and land agents also emerged. Some of them were men from marginalised groups who became recognised as leaders of their kinship groups within the KNC. These indiv iduals almost alway s had links with political parties also. The military gov ernment that had replaced the PPP presented itself as pro-Islamist and members of the Jamaat-iIslami were activ e in the KNC. A mov e to get gas connections in the early 1 980s was attentiv e to this change of political mood. Successful applicants of gas connections recorded the address of their locality as Islamia Colony .
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There was an eager response in the KNC to the establishment of the SKAA in 1 987 . A number of men including Zaman, riv al land agents such as Rehmat Khan, local kinship group leaders such as Aslam Baloch, Mirza, and party activ ists were inv olv ed in mobilising residents to make joint applications for regularisation. Zaman established a local welfare association and set up a small office for it in one of his properties. While formally it was this organisation that lobbied with the SKAA, Zaman and other leaders also made frequent appeals for funds from the residents on the plea that they needed to pay bribes to concerned officials. Past successes such as the recording of local addresses in identity cards and ev idence of public utility connections such as electricity and gas were factors which became relev ant as proof that the settlement had ex isted before the amnesty date. In 1 988, one segment of the KNC was regularised in the sense that the SKAA recognised its eligibility for the leasing of indiv idual plots. Water and sewerage lines were laid in the early 1 990s. A segment where earlier gas connections had been obtained in the name of Islamia Colony was renamed Shahnawaz Bhutto Colony when registering with the water and sewerage public utility . The PPP was back in office and its local activ ists who play ed a role in getting water and sewerage serv ices also sought to reclaim the identity of the colony by naming it after a member of their leader's family . A 1 995 study confirms that most houses had been connected to sewage lines-half of them through a gov ernment scheme and the remainder on a self-help basis (Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute 2002). The last official surv ey was carried out in 1 997 when nearly all of the area currently occupied by the KNC was notified for regularisation.
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It was not only the KNC, howev er, that was ex panding out and increasing its occupation of v acant land by the Gujjar Nala. In the 1 980s, the KDA decided to include a strip of land bey ond the original plan of North Nazimabad, and dev eloped large residential and commercial plots. With the ex pansion of the KNC and the establishment of this ex tension known as R-category the planned and unplanned settlements now share boundary walls.
7 R-category owners complained that the KNC was responsible for lowering the v alue of their
Spectre of eviction
properties, and that its residents were inv olv ed in crimes and immoral activ ities. The upwardly mobile among KNC families resented what they regarded as R-category haughtiness. Matters had escalated to a point where householders in one part of R-category had got together and blocked access streets going through their neighbourhood from the KNC to the main road, forcing the latter to take a longer and more circuitous route.
With the successful negotiation of the regularisation process with the SKAA most of the claimants of ownership in the KNC enjoy a high degree of security in their property rights, and hav e inv ested considerable sav ings into house construction. This is despite the fact that many of them hav e not y et leased their indiv idual plots. Some cite ex pense while others say that a lease issued by the SKAA will not add to their sense of security . Although there is a price premium on plots that hav e acquired the SKAA leases, the fact that it is the SKAA and not the original municipal landowner which is a legal stakeholder creates a justifiable sense of protection among the owners of non-leased plots.
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The spectre of ev iction threats, howev er, is not altogether absent from the colony . A current threat concerns KNC residents whose homes are on the embankments of the drain which are not within the SKAA authorised map. In 2009, residents were informed that land spanning 1 00 feet on either side of the Gujjar Nala will be acquired for the construction of a transport corridor along the drain. This land includes not only sev eral houses that are outside of the SKAA map, but also some that are within the regularised area. While homeowners outside the SKAA map fear uncompensated ev iction, those within the regularised part of the settlement ex pect to be compensated with cash and alternativ e land allotment. The threat of ev iction is seen to be credible in the light of the ex perience of the Ly ari Ex pressway a few y ears ago, which led to the displacement of sev eral thousand homes by the city municipal gov ernment.
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There is also a large group of families who now rent homes from KNC owners because they were ev icted from a nearby unplanned settlement they call Jhuggiy an Hy deri (JH) in 2005. The JH was a settlement with ov er 500 families, a mix of huts and cement houses, electricity connections, local shops, and public buildings such as community mosques. The settlement was thought to be on a public amenity plot and was in a perpetual state of struggle with property owners and residents of neighbouring planned segments of North Nazimabad who complained about the JH lowering property v alues, sheltering petty crime, and encouraging immorality . Most of the JH residents were Seraiki-speaking migrants and their descendants from southern districts of Punjab belonging to marginalised serv ice castes.
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A common account of the ev ents leading up to the ev iction links the action closely with electoral politics. The JH residents had begun lobby ing an officebearer of a faction of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) who had close links with some ethnic Seraikis. In 2005, many JH families decided to support PML candidates in local gov ernment elections, marking them out as potential opponents for the MQM, which then controlled the municipal gov ernment and won the election. According to former JH residents their 'wrong' political choice prov ided their neighbours in the planned settlement with an opportunity to successfully lobby the MQM for pushing ahead with the ev iction.
Discussion
Olson's (1 97 1 ) collectiv e action framework is a useful point of departure for interpreting narrativ es of the KNC's journey towards a relativ ely secure tenure. Secure tenure in the face of planning regulation was, indeed, a public good from which indiv idual residents could not be ex cluded. Homeowners were in no hurry to acquire individual leases from the SKAA once their segment of the settlement was officially notified for regularisation. The production of this public good had entailed a great deal of indiv idual contribution ov er the decades in the form of risky inv estments v ulnerable to demolition, willingness to face legal sanction, and time and money spent lobby ing political leaders and bribing officials.
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Olson (1 97 1 ) was pessimistic about the feasibility of v oluntary , noncoerciv e collectiv e action in situations where indiv idual compliance could not be sanctioned or rewarded, and his pessimism is not entirely belied by the successful instances of collectiv e action in the KNC. We see, in the Pashtun land agents, the ability to use coerciv e means. Moreov er, Olson's prediction concerning within-group inequality is amply supported. Land agents were willing to inv est in producing the public good because they stood to make large gains from it. Their control ov er numerous plots of land, which they could sell at a price premium as the colony became more secure, made them willing inv estors to the benefit of other residents. The inequality between group members was not economic to begin with, but related to social status and political power. A settlement with greater within-group equality , say JH, was unable to find sufficient inv estment in the production of the public good to prev ent ev iction or to negotiate compensation.
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Mov ing on from Olson we also find sub-groups and leaders mediating between the main group (the entire settlement) and indiv iduals. In line with post-Olson rational choice as well as social mov ement theory , we find much use for concepts such as indiv idual heterogeneity , norms, culture, kinship groups, and indigenous free spaces. Sub-groups such as Baloch seasonal migrants, Odh, and Lawa Muslim Shaikh play important parts in the regularisation narrativ es. At first sight, these appear to be primordial kinship groups which used their prior organisation to some adv antage. On closer ex amination, howev er, the picture is more complex . KNC Baloch, for ex ample, are from disparate kinship groups who gained a collectiv e identity largely as a result of their ex perience of migration and residence at the KNC. The Lawa, likewise, acquired a new identity in the KNC and activ ely shed their association with their Muslim Shaikh roots in the home v illage. Moreov er, these and other sub-groups from marginalised rural communities had produced leaders through engagement with the process of regularisation many of whom had become activ ists of political parties.
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There were free spaces, apparently of the 'indigenous' ty pe, in the struggle between regulation and regularisation in the KNC. The widespread acceptance of informal norms and ex isting institutional forms on both sides of the regulation-regularisation div ide was in ev idence at different points in the story . The first challenge to the dominant urban planning idiom was the cultural acceptance of campsites of seasonal migrants on city limits. The knowledge that the presence of women and children raised political and perhaps moral costs of forced ev iction to the authorities was also used to good effect by KNC residents. The status hierarchy ingrained in the use of women implies that ex isting structures of patriarchy ought to be counted among the free spaces used to resist regulation. It was families from rural marginalised communities whose women were av ailable for phy sical resistance, with Regulation, regularisation and political process seclusion being seen as a marker of high status. Reputations, such as those of Pashtun men and Odh women too, were part of discursiv e free spaces.
Urban planning in Karachi focused on the dev elopment of gov ernment owned land on the city 's periphery and its allotment at prices estimated at a quarter of the market v alue (Dowall 1 991 ) . The KDA, which was the prime supplier of land allocated under a tenth of the area it dev eloped to designated low-income housing (Arsalan et al. 2005) , and the gap between allotment and market prices suggest that demand far ex ceeded supply . Partition-related refugee influx had created a large number of makeshift camps which morphed into settlements. There were also pre-Partition settlements, notably the old city quarter of Ly ari, which neither enjoy ed legal title nor access to civ ic amenities. The main response to the presence of unplanned settlements came during Pakistan's first period of military rule in the 1960s, when many Partition refugees residing in the city centre were relocated to planned settlements on the city 's outskirts.
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The first collectiv e attempt at resisting regulation was staged in the old quarter of Ly ari whose residents became aware of plans to raze their locality and to shift them too away from the city . Unlike the relativ ely recent Partition refugees, Ly ari residents of sev eral decades launched a campaign to sav e their neighbourhood. They succeeded in drawing the attention of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a civ ilian minister in Ay ub Khan's military regime, who lobbied within gov ernment for the regularisation of the ex isting settlement. He rallied supporters at a public meeting in Ly ari in 1 963 where he announced that lease documents will be issued to the residents.
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Subsequently , Ly ari became a support base for Bhutto's PPP which contested the country 's first general elections held in 1 97 0 on a populist platform. The PPP formed the gov ernment in 1 97 2 and the inaugural meeting of its prov incial cabinet was held in 1 97 2 at a public park in Ly ari. An early action of the gov ernment was to instruct municipal authorities to issue land titles to Ly ari residents. The link between electoral politics and demandmaking by unplanned settlements was established and the regularisation of unplanned settlements was incorporated into the 1 97 4 master-plan for Karachi (Hasan et al. 1 999) .
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The fall of the PPP gov ernment in 1 97 7 and the re-imposition of military rule did not lead to a rev ersal of the regularisation policy . In fact, the incoming military regime, mindful of its tenuous support base, made further announcements, such as one by the President in January 1 97 8, promising the regularisation of unplanned settlements. 8 The main watershed was the Sindh Katchi Abadi Act of 1 987 that prov ided a comprehensiv e legal and administrativ e framework for the process of regularisation. By 2005, the SKAA had identified539 unplanned settlements of which 483 qualified for regularisation and 37 9 (including the KNC) had been formally regularised.
The rise of the MQM in the 1 980s was premised on its rhetoric of Muhajirs being a middle and lower class community , obscured differences in wealth and status, and allowed it to build support bases in planned and unplanned areas alike. Although most of the top leaders were residents of middle-income planned areas, many of them had links with unplanned settlements where their families had liv ed after first arriv ing in Karachi (Budhani et al. 201 0) . The
The fast growth of the city has, ov er the y ears, attracted num erous people from within as well as outside the country […] . As this inflow of people continued ov er the y ears, land becam e precious and ev en the Ly ari riv er bed becam e prim e residential/com m ercial property as it was right in the heart of the city . The unscrupulous elem ents caught unwary newcom ers who were illegally giv en land along the riv er at cheap prices where they ended up establishing residence. Slowly but steadily the entire stretch of the riv er was encroached, protruding into the riv er bed and constricting the flow of water […] . Furtherm ore social problem s also began to creep up. Fundam entally , as the locality was on encroached land, drug dealing, lawlessness and v ice flourished. The haphazard constr uction of hutm ents left no room for dev elopm ent of civ ic utilities or am enities […]. The problem s were innum erable but solutions lim ited to only one-resettlem ent at a properly planned site in accordance with hum an rights conv entions […] .
[…] But this is just the beginning and the end is a distant reality . Along the way lie m any m ore 'Colonies', m any m ore fam ilies that rem ain em bedded in a m aze of narrow , crooked lanes ov erflow ing with sewage, entangled in a web of illegal electricity connections, with streets without nam es and houses without num bers.
(Ly ari Expressway Resettlem ent Project w ebsite, http://lerpkarachi.com .pk/pages/index.php, last accessed 1 3 Nov em ber 2 01 1 ) MQM's early demands were entirely couched in opposition to those it regarded as ethnic outsiders in Sindh, and did not include any reference to the actual liv ing conditions of its own constituents. 1 0 In some instances, these demands translated into turf battles between party cadre and non-Muhajir residents of unplanned residents, while in other places there were attempts by MQM supporters in planned settlements to curb the ex pansion of new unplanned settlements which were populated by more recent non-Muhajir migrants from within or outside the country (Collectiv e for Social Science Research 2005, Budhani et al. 201 0) . Following the abandonment of its ov ert ethnic label in 1997 , the MQM cultiv ated its image as a party that would deliv er effectiv e urban dev elopment and gov ernance (Baig 2005 , Khan 2007 , 2008 . It enjoy ed control ov er municipal matters for much of the 2000s when the party 's position towards unplanned settlements further hardened in fav our of regulation. Although ethnic rhetoric had been replaced by a stress on civ ic management, nonMuhajir migrants and residents of unplanned settlements suspected ethnic motiv es at play . The Ly ari Ex pressway (LEW), which was built between 2002 and 2009, 1 1 led to the ev iction of between 30,000 to 7 7 ,000 homes along the Ly ari riv erbed. 1 2 Ex tracts from the resettlement project's official website are cited at length as illustrativ e of the project, and by close association, the MQM's attitude towards unplanned settlements:
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The LEW was the largest but not the only 'mega-project' that resulted in ev ictions. A city strategic plan prepared by the municipal gov ernment in 2007 further raised fear among residents of unplanned peri-urban settlements when it declared the city 's outskirts as v acant land ready for dev elopment. The MQM whose early claims of representing the poor were premised in large part on its support base among Muhajirs of unplanned settlements now looked like a protector of incumbents. In the KNC, the MQM was accused of siding with Rcategory property owners. Although residents of unplanned settlements along the Gujjar Nala are unlikely to hav e seen the analy sis of their neighbourhoods on the LEW website, they will hav e been familiar with the mocking and
Conclusion
Bibliography libellous tone of its message through their dealings with neighbours in the Rcategory , or in the treatment receiv ed by JH ev ictees. In the 2008 general elections, the MQM receiv ed a third of the v ote from the KNC compared to 50% for the PPP. In the rest of UC Hy deri, MQM's v ote share was 85% compared to the PPP's 1 2%.
3
What is of particular interest is that the KNC as well as other unplanned settlements had emerged as pockets of opposition to the MQM in constituencies where the party was alway s going to win the ov erall electoral contest. Local sub-group leaders had emerged as interlocutors with political parties, whose more senior leaders v alued a presence in the locality . This happened precisely at a time when the party seemed most powerful with an enhanced reputation for armed force, the backing of a military regime, and control of all lev ers of gov ernment in the city . It was as though the KNC and settlements like it had themselv es become free spaces in the heartland of what seemed then like a hegemonic organisation.
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We believ e that the my riad forms and instances of collectiv e action that lead the establishment of an unplanned settlement and its fitful journey towards regularisation may add up to transformativ e political possibilities ev en if all of the particular instances of collectiv e action are driv en ex clusiv ely by rational self-interest.
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While we agree with Roy (2009) that there need not be any correspondence between informality and pov erty , we find that powerful beneficiaries of informality are destined to take much shorter and less fitful journey s towards legalisation and formal protection of property right. The social marginality of the people inv olv ed insures that they will put up with long periods of v ulnerability to ev iction as a price for an ev entual improv ement in tenure security . Within-group inequality and the utilisation of indigenous free spaces such as the use of women's bo dies to protect a settlement, generate the potential for successful collectiv e action. The seemingly unending reserv es of social inequality in South A sia, often from outside the urban contex t, can thus fuel urban collectiv e action almost indefinitely .
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Under these conditions, we would argue that collectiv e action driv en for rational self-interest, ev en shorn of further moral content is no mean achiev ement. In fact, what appears to be indigenous free spaces such as ethnic or kinship group identity , and patriarchal sub-group leadership, may on closer ex amination turn out to be innov ativ e adaptations to urban possibilities and challenges. But perhaps most importantly , while collectiv e action around unplanned settlements may not transcend into social mov ements, it can help to keep the door open for plural democratic politics. This is not say ing much, but giv en the range of challenges that emanate from determined opponents of democracy in contemporary South Asia, it is not say ing that little either.
